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INTRODUCTION
International disputes and tensions arise in situations
where one nation is seeking its own economic betterment in
ways that diminish the economic welfare of other nations. Prior
to World War II, most nations deployed systems of tariffs and
import quotas in unveiled attempts to protect their domestic in-
dustries. Today, trading tensions are often generated by a
range of government activities that limit imports or subsidize
exports; yet the governments that impose these measures often
rationalize them as policy measures that have no protectionist
or other trading objective. The earlier trading model was a mer-
cantilist one. Economic welfare was seen as a zero-sum game in
which each nation bettered its position when it sold more than it
purchased from abroad. Because all nations could not sell more
than they purchased, some nations were necessarily winners
and others were losers. Under the mercantilist view, the nation
that obtained the greatest surplus of exports over imports was
the greatest winner.
In the early nineteenth century, David Ricardo developed a
theory of free trade.' Under Ricardo's approach, each nation
* Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law
School.
1. DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION
(3d ed. 1821), reprinted in THE WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF DAVID RICARDO
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gained by producing what it was best at producing, i.e., those
goods or services in which it generated the greatest new value.
Then if nations would trade freely, they would each maximize
their own wealth. But Ricardo's theory went somewhat further.
He showed that a nation would maximize its own welfare by
eliminating its own trading barriers, regardless of what other
nations did.
Great Britain followed Ricardo's advice throughout the last
half of the nineteenth century.2 Ricardian analysis, however,
exerted only a limited impact on other nations. The Cobden-
Chevalier Treaty of 1860 between Great Britain and France,3
together with most-favored-nation clauses in French treaties
with other nations, only temporarily lowered tariffs throughout
much of Europe.4 Germany opted for a protectionist policy in
1879.5 France, where enthusiasm for free trade had declined
substantially after the Franco-Prussian War, began its return to
protectionism by sharply raising tariffs in 1881, imposing full
agricultural protection by 1890, and completing that return in
the 1892 M6line tariff.6 The United States maintained substan-
tial tariffs throughout the nineteenth century and into the
twentieth century.
Although Ricardo provided a powerful analysis, substantial
practical impediments block the path towards a goal of fully free
trade. Ricardian analysis shows that aggregate free trade will
maximize national wealth but will not evenly distribute new
wealth. Indeed, free trade produces both winners and losers.
Consumers, export industries, and industries that use foreign
products as inputs into their production processes are likely to
win. Industries that become subjected to intensified competition
from producers from abroad are likely to become losers. Be-
cause business firms in adversely-affected industries are more
likely to be organized than consumers, they are more likely to be
128-49 (Piero Sraffa ed., Cambridge 1951).
2. See, e.g., Douglas A. Irwin, The Political Economy of Free Trade: Voting in
the British General Election of 1906, 37 J.L. & ECON. 75, 78--79 (1994).
3. Treaty of Commerce Between Great Britain and France, Jan. 23, 1860, 50
British and Foreign State Papers 13.
4. Ronald A. Brand, GATT and the Evolution of United States Trade Law, 18
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 101, 109-10 (1992).
5. Id. at 110.
6. L.C.A. KNOWLES, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY:
FRANCE, GERMANY, RUSSIA, AND THE UNITED STATES 252-53 (1932); GERARD
CURZON, MULTILATERAL COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY: THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON
TARIFFS AND TRADE AND ITS IMPACT ON NATIONAL COMMERCIAL POLICIES AND
TECHNIQUES 18 (1965).
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able to exert political pressures on government decision mak-
ers.' Moreover, because they have traditionally focused on mar-
keting to the large domestic market, the economic interests of
American producers have-at least until relatively recently-
been weighted towards protectionism. Similarly, labor unions
representing workers in these potentially affected industries are
another source of protectionist pressure. These groups are
likely to lobby against exposing their industries to foreign com-
petition. In short, Ricardian analysis indicates that free trade
maximizes national wealth, but in most nations that analysis
becomes subordinated to the interests of those groups that exert
the most effective political pressure. These groups are precisely
the groups that would suffer under free trade.
In the United States, Alexander Hamilton's Report on
Manufactures' urged protection for domestic manufacturing in
order to foster its growth. Congress did not act upon Hamilton's
Report as such, but it did follow his recommendation on protect-
ing domestic industry. Throughout the nineteenth and much of
the twentieth centuries, American industry developed and pros-
pered behind the tariff laws' barriers. Indeed, except for three
years during the Civil War, the tariff provided the principal
source of revenue to the federal government throughout the
nineteenth century. 9
Prior to World War II, tariffs and other trading barriers
plagued Europe. These barriers impeded European manufac-
turers from attaining the full benefits of scale economies be-
cause the barriers made it difficult for them to market their
goods in neighboring countries. Further, because trading barri-
ers limited the market in which goods could be sold, they were a
principal cause of unemployment and consequent social unrest.
In the pre-World War II period, nations jockeyed to advance
their own industries at the expense of foreign industries. They
erected trade barriers and often adjusted the exchange rates of
their currencies in order to advantage their trading positions.
The failed European experience with protectionism helped to
motivate a number of European nations to create the European
Common Market in 1957.10 An earlier and more far-reaching at-
7. MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 143 (1965).
8. Alexander Hamilton, Report on Manufactures (Dec. 5, 1791), in THE
REPORTS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1964).
9. Brand, supra note 4, at 107-08.
10. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 11; see, e.g., John Pinder, The Single Market: A Step Towards Union, in
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tack on protectionism, however, began with the creation by the
world's major trading nations of the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947.11
The GATT was designed to foster trade over the long run.
Under the GATT, member states agreed to eliminate non-tariff
barriers and to gradually reduce tariffs through periodic rounds
of negotiations. The GATT produced several rounds of negotia-
tions that reduced tariffs substantially. In 1994, its Uruguay
Round of negotiations produced the World Trade Organization
(WTO)," a successor structure to the original GATT.
The GATT and its WTO successor have been enormously
successful. However, the issues that continue to generate trad-
ing friction are, not surprisingly, variations of the issues that
have accompanied the debate over free trade since the early
nineteenth century. Governments sometimes distort trade flows
in order to advance their own national interests at the expense
of global welfare. Although the Ricardian paradigm suggests
that it is impossible to advance national welfare in this way,
governments sometimes behave as if this were possible. Indeed,
as discussed below, recent scholarship has shown that-
contrary to the Ricardian paradigm-there are limited possibili-
ties for governments to distort trade to their national advan-
tage. Some governments, therefore, may exploit this new learn-
ing. We have also learned that markets do not always operate
perfectly. As a result, governments properly intervene in do-
mestic markets to generate positive externalities, to reduce or
eliminate negative externalities, and to correct other market
malfunctions. The line between some of these interventions
that are widely recognized as proper functions of government
and the government market interventions that improperly dis-
tort international trade flows is sometimes blurry or unclear.
For example, government actions designed to generate positive
externalities by encouraging the concentration of a new industry
in a particular geographic location (thus enabling firms to par-
ticipate in the same highly skilled labor pool) may extend to
government subsidization that advantages the domestic indus-
try in competition with its rivals from abroad.
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE CHALLENGE OF THE FUTURE 51-52 (Juliet
Lodge ed., 2d ed. 1993).
11. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
12. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
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Some of the most important issues that give rise to interna-
tional tensions are clouded in rhetoric, misunderstanding, or
disagreements about the role of economics. Governments fre-
quently impede trade through regulations or other measures
that are ostensibly keyed to non-trade objectives. Sometimes it
is unclear whether the asserted rationale is intended to obscure
protectionist intent. Sometimes a trading impediment will gen-
erate tensions, regardless of its rationale. Yet in both circum-
stances, rhetoric in which one jurisdiction justifies a trade bar-
rier on policy grounds that are superficially unrelated to trade
and in which another jurisdiction employs free (or freer) trade
rhetoric to criticize that barrier will characterize the trading
tensions that arise. Many of these issues are related to one or
more of these overlapping areas: (1) traditional concern with
import penetration; (2) industrial policy; (3) competition policy;
(4) intellectual property; (5) strategic trade policy; (6) interac-
tions between industrial, competition, and trade policies; and (7)
disagreements about the role of economics.
I. IMPORT PENETRATION ISSUES
The paradigm situation giving rise to trade disputes occurs
when an increased volume of imports impinges on the market
shares of the domestic producers of the same product. If the
imports are sold in the domestic market for less than in their
home market (or for less than cost), this situation may trigger
the application of anti-dumping laws. 3 Assume, however, that
the imports are sold at or above their home-market price and
above their cost of production and transport. The next question
is whether the import surge is a temporary phenomenon or
whether its continuance over the long term appears likely.
Temporary import surges are less likely to cause, or to
threaten to cause, the serious injury that both international law
and U.S. law require as a condition for providing import relief.
Resort to protectionist measures in such circumstances would
overstep the narrow authority to limit imports that the Agree-
ment on Safeguards recognizes.' 5 For example, the WTO Appel-
13. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673-1677k (2000).
14. See infra notes 18-40 and accompanying text.
15. Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establish-
ing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1, Legal Instruments-Results of the
Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Agreement on Safeguards].
2006]
MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW
late Body ruled illegal 6 the duties that President Bush placed
on steel imports in 2002, 7 and the duties were probably illegal
under U.S. law as well.
If the import surge appears likely to continue indefinitely,
the reason is probably related to the relative cost efficiencies of
the foreign producers vis-A-vis the affected domestic producers.
In such a case, the domestic industry has two options: (1) exit
the market or (2) take steps to increase its efficiency, bringing
itself up to international standards of competitiveness. Article
XIX of GATT 1947 and the Uruguay Round Agreement on Safe-
guards govern the steps that an affected nation may take."8 The
Agreement on Safeguards provides that nations may take action
when a product "is being imported into its territory in such in-
creased quantities, absolute or relative to domestic production,
and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause seri-
ous injury to the domestic industry that produces like or directly
competitive products." 9 In such a case, the affected nation may
limit imports for an initial period of four years, which the nation
may extend to a total of eight years. 0 In general, the limitation
(if it takes the form of a quota) may not reduce imports below
the average of the last three representative years for which sta-
tistics are available.2 U.S. law includes a safeguards provision
which is cast in language close to that of the Agreement on Safe-
guards.22 Upon the U.S. International Trade Commission find-
ing that an article is being imported into the United States in
such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious
injury (or threat of serious injury) to a domestic industry, the
President may (within broad parameters) impose additional du-
ties or quantitative restrictions on the importation of that arti-
cle.
23
The key question underlying protection when the viability
16. Appellate Body Report, United States-Definitive Safeguard Measures on
Imports of Certain Steel Products, WT/DS248-54, 258-59AB/R (Nov. 10, 2003).
17. See Proclamation 7529, 67 Fed. Reg. 10,553 (Mar. 7, 2002); Action Under
Section 203 of the Trade Act of 1974 Concerning Steel Products, 67 Fed. Reg. 10,593
(Mar. 7, 2002).
18. GATT, supra note 11, art. XIX; Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 15,
art. 2.
19. Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 15, art 2.
20. Id. art. 7.
21. Id. art. 5.
22. 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (2000).
23. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2253(a)(3)(A)-(C). Broad limitations upon the President's
power to increase duties or impose quantitative limits are contained in 19 U.S.C. §
2253(e). See also 19 U.S.C. §§ 2253(e)(1)(B)(2)-(4).
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of the domestic industry is threatened is whether it can ulti-
mately be restored to competitiveness or whether it will be
forced to exit the market. The scenario that takes place when a
flood of imports threatens local industry with extinction tends to
take the following path: The imports are likely taking a growing
share of the domestic market from the local producers. The in-
flux of imports may be driving domestic prices below unit pro-
duction costs. This is especially likely in an industry with heavy
capital costs. Indeed, in such an industry, this effect is exacer-
bated as local producers reduce their production in response to
an excess of goods in relation to demand. In such circum-
stances, their unit costs are pressured upwards as they reduce
production. Revitalizing the industry may require domestic
producers to invest in new plants, but they may be reluctant to
do this at a time when there is overcapacity, output from exist-
ing plant is selling at below-average-cost prices, and they are
losing market share or incurring losses.24
One device that other nations employ in the above circum-
stances is a form of industry-run or government-run cartel. Un-
der this response, the domestic producers work out a plan
among themselves governing the reinvestment that is required
for the recovery of the industry. Alternatively, they accept a
government-designed plan for reinvestment, or a plan devised
with heavy input from that industry. All of these approaches
require domestic producers to follow a plan that guides them on
how much of existing plant to scrap and how much new plant to
acquire. 25  By formulating such a plan, industry overcapacity
can be eliminated and production can be consolidated in effi-
ciency-enhancing ways. In addition, the risks associated with
new investment are reduced, easing the transition from an in-
dustry based on outmoded plant to one based on state-of-the-art
plant. The European Synthetic Fiber Agreement 2' and an
agreement restructuring the Dutch brick industry27 take this
approach. Japan also takes this approach when its domestic in-
24. See Harry First, Structural Antitrust Rules and International Competition:
The Case of Distressed Industries, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1054, 1069 (1987) (discussing
timing of capacity reduction and reinvestment).
25. Efficiencies of scale and/or scope might accompany consolidation in some
industries. Consolidation carries the potential for faster learning curve advances.
Consolidation could potentially also generate a variety of efficiencies in administra-
tion. See, e.g., First, supra note 24, at 1069.
26. Commission Decision 84/380, 1984 O.J. (L 207) 17 (EC).
27. Commission Decision 94/296/EC of 29 April 1994 Relating to a Proceeding
Under Article 85 of the EC Treaty, 1994 O.J. (L 131) 15, 16.
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dustries require revitalization.28 In the following discussion,
this approach to industry restructuring will be referred to as a
"crisis cartel approach."
The crisis cartel approach to industry restructuring appears
to be unavailable to U.S. industries afflicted by an avalanche of
imports. Because the prevailing ideology within the United
States is one of unfettered competition, widespread public dis-
approval would meet any suggestion that a cartel-like process
should oversee restructuring. 29 The law, in any event, would bar
any such mechanism. Industry-wide agreements on investment
would be condemned as per se illegal under the Sherman Act.3°
Although the United States has incorporated a safeguards
provision into its domestic law, it has handicapped itself in us-
ing it. On the one hand, the safeguards provision permits the
U.S. government to provide temporary relief from imports.3' On
the other hand, it is far from clear how the domestic industry
can restore itself to world-class competitiveness during this
temporary period in the absence of a collective plan, which the
antitrust laws forbid. The U.S. safeguards provisions them-
selves require assessments of the industry's progress in mod-
ernization. 2 Yet a collective action problem may block the cru-
cial steps. Reinvestment-and the modernization that it makes
possible-may appear to each domestic producer as both futile
and unprofitable in the absence of assurance that the remainder
of the industry is reducing aggregate capacity. The Agreement
on Safeguards imposes time constraints on protection that
sometimes may be too short for the market to generate capacity
reductions through individual decisions not to reinvest. The cri-
sis cartel approach described above may provide an answer to
this collective action problem in other jurisdictions.
Is there an inherent contradiction built into the U.S. safe-
28. MITSUO MATSUSHITA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND COMPETITION LAW IN
JAPAN 280-85 (1993) (relief for depressed industries); TAKATOSHI ITO, THE
JAPANESE ECONOMY 204-05 (1992) (depression cartels).
29. See generally Daniel J. Gifford, Antitrust and Trade Issues: Similarities,
Differences, and Relationships, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1049 (1995). The crisis cartel ap-
proach is discussed in Gifford, supra; First, supra note 24; and Benjamin A. Tisdell,
"Steeling" the World: Economic and Antitrust Implications of Steel Industry Cartels
as Alternatives to Trade Protectionism, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 473 (2002)
30. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). Agreements among competitors re-
stricting output are generally treated as per se illegal. Federal Trade Comm'n v.
Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 423 (1990); Nat'l Collegiate Ath-
letic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 99 (1984).
31. 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (2000).
32. 19 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000).
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guards law? The Agreement on Safeguards shapes the U.S.
safeguards provisions. That Agreement may reflect an interna-
tional consensus about how an industry that becomes vulner-
able to increased import penetration may restructure itself to
regain a state of international competitiveness. Other nations
may understand the crisis cartel mechanism as a tool for over-
coming what they may see as collective action problems that
would impede the regeneration of an afflicted industry in this
kind of situation. The United States, however, adheres to the
Agreement on Safeguards but avoids the crisis cartel mecha-
nism that other nations may see as implicit in its use. Is the
United States waiting for a market solution that the market
(constrained by the time limitations of the safeguards provi-
sions) is impeded from supplying?
For relief against import surges, in past years the United
States has tended to rely upon voluntary export restraints and
upon anti-dumping proceedings.33 During the surge of Japanese
automobile imports in the 1980s, the Reagan administration
happily let the Japanese government pressure its auto manufac-
turers into export restraints.34 The U.S. government avoided
proposing any agreement with the Japanese government and
thus maintained its theoretical free trade stance while obtaining
the import relief that it desired.35 Anti-dumping proceedings
depend on the fiction that the foreign producers in question are
selling in the U.S. market below "fair value."M This characteri-
zation enables U.S. officials and domestic business lobbies to
portray the proceedings as consistent with a "fair" version of
free trade. Yet the statute defines "fair value," inter alia, as a
price below cost and includes within the definition of "cost" ele-
ments that business persons and economists do not generally
consider to be components of cost.37 The traditional avoidance of
safeguards proceedings has enabled officials and interest groups
to publicly maintain their adherence to a free trade ideology
while they simultaneously seek import relief. Now that the
33. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673-1677k (2000).
34. See CLYDE V. PRESTOWITZ, JR., TRADING PLACES: How WE ALLOWED JAPAN
TO TAKE THE LEAD 422-23 (1988) (describing the erection of the voluntary restraint
with the active participation of the U.S. government but without its formal adher-
ence).
35. Id.
36. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (2000). Whether a product is being sold at less than fair
value is determined by comparing the export price with "normal value." 19 U.S.C. §
1677b (2000).
37. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1677b(b), (e) (2000).
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Agreement on Safeguards prohibits voluntary export re-
straints,8 that strategy must rely more heavily upon anti-
dumping proceedings to achieve the desired protection while os-
tensibly eschewing protectionism.
This apparent avoidance of dealing with collective action
problems in safeguards situations is a puzzle. In a variety of
other circumstances, U.S. law recognizes market failures and
takes corrective action. For example, intellectual property laws
are responses to market failures. Environmental regulation is
premised upon market failure. A forthright attempt to address
the economic and social issues surrounding import-penetration
issues would hold the anti-dumping laws up to the scrutiny they
deserve. At present their application is hidden in a jungle of
administrative obscurantism that treats commonly-used
phrases such as "fair value" and "cost" as terms of art.3 ' The
U.S. government would better serve the public if greater resort
were made to safeguards procedures where protection stands
fully revealed. If safeguards proceedings became the common
method for seeking import relief, the issues underlying industry
restructuring (including collective action problems) would ulti-
mately be recognized and publicly debated. Whether or not in-
dustry restructuring would be welfare enhancing in any given
case, the public would be served by greater transparency in the
policy debate. Moreover, an allowance of collective action to fos-
ter restructuring would likely be less welfare-reducing than our
apparent present national policy of providing protection to inef-
ficient industries with no plans for their rejuvenation.
In situations in which imports surge and erode the market
shares of competing domestic producers, pressures mount for re-
lief. Nations experiencing such situations take a variety of
courses. The United States has tended to rely upon anti-
dumping proceedings and voluntary export restraints. Other
nations, at least at times, have taken different routes, including
the use of so-called crisis cartels. The heavy U.S. reliance on
anti-dumping proceedings has generated and fostered wide-
spread distrust and cynical views of those proceedings, espe-
cially among affected foreign nations. In the eyes of U.S. ob-
38. Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 15, art. 11(1)(b).
39. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
40. Thus if a collective action problem prevents an industry from restructuring
itself into profitability, the invocation of safeguards accompanied by a resolution of
the collective action problem may be more welfare-enhancing (or less welfare-
reducing) than invoking safeguards without such a resolution.
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servers, the use of crisis cartels in Europe and Japan is likely to
reinforce beliefs that those jurisdictions are not fully committed
to open markets and free trade goals. These differences of view,
however, reflect only a small part of the potential misunder-
standings that underlie today's trade tensions.
II. INDUSTRIAL POLICY
The role that government should play in the economy is the
subject of both widespread agreement and significant disagree-
ment. There is agreement that government has a proper role to
play in economic affairs and that neglect of that role detracts
from welfare. Thus, government carries a responsibility to pro-
vide the infrastructure, such as effective means of communica-
tion and transportation, on which the rest of the economy de-
pends.41 That responsibility also extends to the fostering of an
educated workforce. Much of this infrastructure consists of so-
called "public goods," i.e., goods that because they are non-
appropriable (a lighthouse is the classic example),42 will there-
fore not be generated by the market. Government responsibili-
ties also include action to reduce or eliminate negative external-
ities, such as pollutants which cause social harm but which do
not show up on the books of the firm producing them. Accord-
ingly, because they do not constitute costs to the firm, that firm
has no incentive to control them.
The extent to which governments possess capabilities for
fostering economic growth beyond the type of actions described
above is a matter of controversy, both in the United States and
abroad. Although there is widespread agreement about the gov-
ernment's role in providing infrastructure, the bounds of that
infrastructural involvement have always been the subject of de-
bate. Just what is the extent of the government's responsibility
for educating the workforce? To what extent does this responsi-
bility extend to higher education? Does the provision of infra-
structure extend to the support of basic research? American re-
sponses to these questions are not necessarily replicated in
other nations.43 The proper scope for these particular govern-
41. Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons
Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 924-25 (2005).
42. But see Ronald H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. & ECON.
357 (1974) (showing the inadequacies of lighthouses as premises for public-goods
analyses).
43. See, e.g., Thomas J. Siepmann, The Global Exportation of the U.S. Bayh-
20061
MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW
mental activities are sometimes the subject of national political
debate, but they are generally not controversial from an inter-
national perspective. Rather, the response of a government to
internal pressures to provide differential support for particular
industries or firms can generate international controversy. The
U.S. debates over domestic policy during the 1980s and 1990s
focused on exactly this issue.
In the United States, the edge of the internal industrial pol-
icy debates lay in the extent to which government should inter-
vene on behalf of specific industries or even of specific business
firms." The policy debate reached a peak during the 1980s
when Japanese imports were seen as posing significant threats
to many U.S. manufacturing industries, such as automobiles,
machine tools, and semiconductor chips." The debate re-
emerged in the early 1990s with the Clinton administration.
The Clinton administration was widely seen as more interven-
tionist in the economy than its predecessors. 6 Moreover, many
officials in that administration had participated in the debates
of the 1980s as advocates of interventionist policies.47
These debates, however, appear to have generated a con-
sensus that the government's role should be the traditional one:
it can promote national welfare by contributing to the infra-
structure, but it is generally incapable of advancing aggregate
welfare by supporting particular industries or business firms.
This consensus recognizes that government lacks the informa-
tional resources of the market and so cannot identify growth in-
dustries as well as the market can. In addition, the government
decision making apparatus is handicapped by its vulnerability
to political pressures that seek to skew government decision
making towards private lobbying interests.
Dole Act, 30 U. DAYTON L. REV. 209, 239-40 (2004) (describing funding for higher
education and research in the United States and abroad as well as the decision of
many European nations to follow the United States' lead in expanding the availabil-
ity of patent rights to university scientists).
44. See generally William E. Hudson, The Feasibility of a Comprehensive U.S.
Industrial Policy, 100 POL. SCI. Q. 461 (1985); Stuart E. Eizenstat, Reindustrializa-
tion Through Coordination or Chaos?, 2 YALE J. ON REG. 39 (1984); Roger Pilon, On
the Folly and Illegitimacy of Industrial Policy, 5 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 103 (1993).
45. See, e.g., Gifford, supra note 29, at 1074.
46. See, e.g., Michael L. Doane, Green Light Subsidies: Technology Policy in In-
ternational Trade, 21 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 155, 157, 162-65 (1995) (describ-
ing Clinton interventionist programs).
47. See ROBERT B. REICH, THE NEXT AMERICAN FRONTIER (1983); Steve Char-
novitz, Designing American Industrial Policy: General Versus Sectoral Approaches, 5
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 78 (1993); Eizenstat, supra note 44.
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Other nations have not reached that consensus. Govern-
ments sometimes cannot or will not limit their pursuit of indus-
trial policies to domestic applications. The use of crisis cartels
in some other jurisdictions as a means for rejuvenating ineffi-
cient industries was discussed above. Now consider government
use of a special form of industrial policy: The employment of
trading policies designed to alter the terms of trade. Those poli-
cies also carry the potential for generating barriers to trade.
Government support for particular industries can affect the way
it administers both its competition policies and its trade policies.
It can affect the way that it subsidizes particular industries or
industrial ventures. For example, the European Union (EU), in
the eyes of many American observers, may be supporting the
Airbus venture in an effort to generate economic rents, to foster
high-tech industry as an aid to growth, and to foster the devel-
opment of a highly skilled employment base. The discussion of
strategic trade policy below suggests that government support
for the Airbus venture may well generate economic rents.4s Ad-
ditionally, the Japanese government has a long history of gov-
ernment-industry cooperation under which local industries have
been protected from foreign competition and in which Japan has
virtually guaranteed markets for high-tech components through
the vertical relationships inherent in Japanese industrial or-
ganization. These matters are discussed below.
When governments pursue industrial policies-especially
those designed to promote more rapid development of particular
sectors of their economies-they are necessarily seeking to alter
the current distribution of comparative advantage. Because the
Ricardian theory of comparative advantage has been widely un-
derstood to have served as the premise for the original GATT
and the subsequent rounds of negotiations that have culminated
in the WTO, some proponents of free trade have seen a tension
between industrial policy and free trade goals. Moreover, pro-
ponents of free trade within the United States have based their
positions upon Ricardian theory. Accordingly, the United States
is likely to be especially critical of trade impediments raised by
other nations on an industrial policy rationale. Trade tensions
are likely to be exacerbated if and when the jurisdiction employ-
ing an industrial policy approach to economic development de-
nies that it is practicing protection.49
48. See infra notes 92-103.
49. Thus, for example, in the 1980s, the Japanese government had both abol-
ished formal barriers to the importation of semiconductor chips and taken an array
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III. INCONSISTENT COMPETITION POLICIES
On the surface, competition policy appears to be highly con-
gruent with free trade objectives. Fully free trade would allo-
cate the world's resources in accordance with their highest val-
ued uses, and nations that have enacted competition laws
ensure that their national resources will be allocated according
to their highest valued uses. Yet appearances are sometimes
misleading. Competition policies differ and some competition
policies are less focused upon fostering an efficient allocation of
goods and services than are others." Competition policies that
incorporate significant distributional goals may be capable of
impeding trade. Thus, for example, competition policies that
are administered to shield producers from intensive competition
can exert a protectionist effect when more efficient foreign rivals
challenge those producers.5 Even the competition policies of
two or more jurisdictions that purport to embrace the same ab-
stract goals may be interpreted differently at implementation
levels.5 As a result, competition policies-which ideally ought
to reinforce freer trade-sometimes generate trading tensions.
Relations between the United States and the EU were
strained when the European Commission initially disapproved
the Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas merger.5  After the U.S. gov-
ernment exerted considerable diplomatic pressure, the Commis-
sion approved the merger only on condition that Boeing surren-
der three exclusive supply contracts that it had negotiated with
three large U.S. carriers (American, Continental, and Delta).54
of measures designed to prevent any "adverse effect on domestic firms which might
produce confusion in the market," thus effectively protecting its developing semicon-
ductor industry. PRESTOWITZ, supra note 34, at 134; see also LAURA D'ANDREA
TYSON, WHO'S BASHING WHOM?: TRADE CONFLICT IN HIGH-TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES
95-96 (1992).
50. See generally Daniel J. Gifford & Robert T. Kudrle, Rhetoric and Reality in
the Merger Standards of the United States, Canada, and the European Union, 72
ANTITRUST L.J. 423 (2005).
51. See Jeffrey M. Peterson, Comment, Unrest in the European Commission:
The Changing Landscape and Politics of International Mergers for United States
Companies, 24 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 377, 390-91 (2002).
52. See Gifford & Kurdrle, supra note 50, at 424-25.
53. See H.R. Con. Res. 117, 105th Cong. (1997) ("[e]xpressing the sense of the
Congress regarding the interference of the European Commission in the merger of
the Boeing Company and McDonnell-Douglas").
54. Commission Decision, Case IV/M.877, Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas, 1997
O.J. (L 336) 16, 46, 68-71, 116 (EC); see Daniel J. Gifford & E. Thomas Sullivan,
Can International Antitrust Be Saved for the Post-Boeing Merger World?: A Proposal
to Minimize International Conflict and to Rescue Antitrust from Misuse, 44
ANTITRUST BULL. 55 (2000) (discussing the Commission's decision).
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It is unclear why the merger would violate the European Merger
Regulation55 with the contracts but would not violate the regula-
tion without the contracts. Some observers construed the Com-
mission action as designed to advantage the European aircraft
manufacturer Airbus in its competition with Boeing, its U.S. ri-
val .
Boeing's acquisition of McDonnell-Douglas eliminated the
third ranking manufacturer of large commercial aircraft, leav-
ing in the field only itself and Airbus. The U.S. antitrust au-
thorities nonetheless cleared the merger on the ground that
McDonnell-Douglas-although it continued to manufacturer its
current line of aircraft-had ceased to be a developer of new air-
craft models. The Supreme Court formulated this type of anti-
trust analysis in 1974 when it decided the General Dynamics
case. 5' In that case, the Court viewed a coal mining company
(United Electric) as no longer a player in the market for long-
term supply contracts for coal because the company had already
committed most of its reserves to buyers.59 As a result, its
merger with a second coal mining company (Material Service
Corp. and its successor General Dynamics) did not significantly
affect competition in the market for long-term supply contracts
for coal.60 The European Commission, however, evaluated the
merger differently. It viewed the merger as strengthening Boe-
ing and thus advantaging Boeing in its competition with Airbus.
In the language of the European Merger Regulation, the merger
strengthened Boeing's "dominant position."6' Somewhat ironi-
55. The Merger Regulation in effect at the time of the Boeing decision was
Council Regulation 4064/89, 1990 O.J. (L 257) 13 (EC). That Regulation has since
been revised and is now Council Regulation 139/2004, 2004 O.J. (L.24) 1 (EC).
56. Paul B. Stephan, Global Governance, Antitrust, and the Limits of Interna-
tional Cooperation, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 173, 192 (2005); Harry First, The Intersec-
tion of Trade and Antitrust Remedies, 12 ANTITRUST 16, 18-19 (1997); Thomas E.
Kauper, Merger Control in the United States and the European Union: Some Obser-
vations, 74 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 305, 319 (2000) ("[Tlhe criticism of the [European]
Commission's approach to the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas case as trade policy ori-
ented or, more pejoratively, protectionist, has at least the ring of plausibility.").
57. Boeing Co., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 24,295 (July 1, 1997) (closing inves-
tigation of proposed merger of Boeing Corp. and McDonnell-Douglas Corp.).
58. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
59. Id. at 499-504.
60. Id. at 506.
61. The Merger Regulation in effect at the time of the European Commission's
Boeing decision had been adopted in 1989 and became effective in 1990. Council
Regulation 4064/89, supra note 55. That Regulation was revised in 2004. Council
Regulation 139/2004, supra note 55. Both versions of the Merger Regulations pro-
hibit mergers that create or strengthen a "dominant position" because such mergers
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cally, in the years following the Commission's conditional ap-
proval of the merger, Airbus has outsold Boeing, thereby replac-
ing Boeing as the "dominant" manufacturer of commercial air-
craft.62
A similar conflict in antitrust law occurred a few years later
in connection with the proposed merger between General Elec-
tric and Honeywell.63 Although the U.S. antitrust enforcement
authorities cleared the merger, the European Commission pro-
hibited the merger largely on the ground that the merged com-
pany could bundle products at a package price that none of its
European competitors could meet.64 Although the European
Court of First Instance has recently affirmed the Commission's
decision, it distanced itself from the Commission's bundling
analysis in so doing.65
Even more recently, the European Commission ruled that
the Microsoft Corporation's bundling of its Media Player with its
Windows operating system was an abuse of dominant position
under the European competition law.66 That case is also under
appeal. The Korean Fair Trade Commission issued a similar rul-
ing.67 These decisions appear to conflict directly with the ap-
proach taken by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
towards technological tying.68 That court ruled that because the
incorporation of new functionalities into the operating system is
the way that much innovation proceeds in the software indus-
try, the law should create an exception for platform software to
would impede effective competition in a substantial part of the common market.
Council Regulation 4064/89, supra note 55, at 16; Council Regulation 139/2004, su-
pra note 55, at 7.
62. See, e.g., Stanley Holmes & Carol Matlack, Boeing is Choking on Airbus'
Fumes, BUS. WEEK, June 30, 2003, at 50, 50 (noting that 2003 could mark "the third
year in a row Airbus won not only more orders [for commercial aircraft], but also
more of the lucrative widebody variety").
63. Commission Decision, Case COMP/M.2220, General Electric/Honeywell,
2004 O.J. (L 48) 1 (EU).
64. Id. IT 353, 378. See discussion in Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 50, at 459
(2005).
65. Case T-209/01, Honeywell Int'l Inc. v. Comm'n of the European Communi-
ties, 2005, http-//www.curia.eu.inten/content/juris/index.htm (click on T-209/01
Judgement of 14/12/2005, Honeywell/Commission). See id., at 1$ 36, 78, 86, 102,
121, 122, 126.
66. Case T-201104R2, Microsoft v. Comm'n of the European Communities,
2004, http'//www.curia.eu.int/en/content/juris/index.htm (click on T-201/04 Order of
22/12/2004, MicrosoftICommission). Microsoft's interim appeal was denied. Id.
67. See generally KFTC Condemns Microsoft for Bundling Applications with
Windows Operating System, 89 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. 626 (2005).
68. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 84-95 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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the otherwise applicable per se rule governing tying arrange-
ments .9
All of these decisions either have generated significant in-
ternational tension or have carried the potential for doing so.
The widely held American view was that industrial policy con-
cerns skewed the European Commission's Boeing decision.7 o
Many U.S. observers view the GE/Honeywell decision as keyed
to the protection of European firms from the competition of a
more efficient foreign rival." The Microsoft decision appears to
have ramifications for that company's operations and its rela-
tionships with rivals and customers on a world-wide scale-
effects that the easy transmission of digital programming ag-
gravates. The Boeing and GE/Honeywell decisions also have
global consequences. These decisions have affected global com-
petition and trade flows. Moreover, in the Microsoft case, Sun
Microsystems, one of Microsoft's U.S. competitors, lobbied the
Commission to reach a result that had been rejected in the U.S.
courts, thus emphasizing-from a U.S. perspective-the Euro-
pean Commission's actual and potential impingement on U.S.
economic policy.72
Competition policy ostensibly is directed towards the fur-
therance of allocative efficiency-i.e., the goal of directing soci-
ety's resources towards their highest valued uses. Free trade
fosters an analogous result: under a free trade regime, the world
directs its resources toward their highest valued uses. When
competition policy is administered in ways that detract from al-
locative efficiency, it generates the appearance of pursuing goals
that are less compatible with those of free trade. When competi-
tion policy produces results that effectively protect domestic in-
dustry, that perception is likely to be reinforced. In the latter
case, the administration of competition policy is open to inter-
pretation as a tool of protectionism. It is thus a double-edged
sword: as world markets become increasingly global, competi-
69. Id.
70. Lisa M. Renzi, Comment, The GE/Honeywell Merger: Catalyst in the
Transnational Conglomerate Merger Debate, 37 NEw ENG. L. REV. 109, 139 n.249
(2002) ("Boeing's major competitor, Airbus Industries, was the primary objector to
the merger, and the Commission was widely regarded as molding European compe-
tition policy to fit Airbus' interests.").
71. See Eric S. Hochstat, Note, The Brown Shoe of European Union Competi-
tion Law, 24 CARDOzO L. REV. 287, 291 n.19 (2002) (reporting contentions of protec-
tionism by Senators Trent Lott and Mike DeWine).
72. Amanda Cohen, Surveying the Microsoft Antitrust Universe, 19 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 333, 355 (2004).
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tion policy can become increasingly important as an adjunct to
trade, as it fosters free entry and subjects all business firms to
competition from their global rivals. Yet in those instances
when major jurisdictions take different approaches to the ad-
ministration of competition law as it affects global competitors,
competition law itself can be a significant source of tension.
IV. POTENTIAL TROUBLES AT THE INTERSECTION OF
COMPETITION POLICY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW
The interface between intellectual property law and anti-
trust (or competition) law is another area where the European
competition law authorities appear to have departed from the
route taken in the United States. These differences carry the
potential for generating trade conflict if and when the European
rules compel a U.S. multinational firm to choose between doing
business in Europe and sharing its intellectual property with
European rivals.
In Magill,7 3 the European Court of Justice ruled that televi-
sion stations could not enforce the copyright protection which
Irish law extends to their program schedules in order to prevent
an independent company (Magill) from publishing a combined
guide to all television programming.74 The court ruled that
ownership of the copyright conferred a "dominant position" on
the companies, requiring them to license the schedules to
Magill.75 Otherwise the companies would abuse their dominant
positions within the meaning of Article 82 of the Treaty.6
Magill thus raised the issue as to whether intellectual property
rights in a patent or copyright conferred on the holder a "domi-
nant position" within the meaning of Article 82 and, if so,
whether a refusal to license those rights would constitute an
"abuse" of that dominant position. The Magill issue has reap-
peared in various forms in European case law, most recently in
IMS Health.77 The latter case involved a copyrighted structure
73. Joined Cases C-241 & C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann & Indep. Televi-
sion Pub. Ltd. v. Comm'n, 1995 E.C.R. 1-0743.
74. Id. 47.
75. Id. 54.
76. Id. It 54-58. The Treaty provision prohibiting an abuse of a dominant po-
sition is currently article 82. At the time of the decision in Magill, it was numbered
as article 86.
77. See generally Council Decision 20011165, 2002 O.J. (L 59) (EC); see also
Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. v. NDC Health GmbH & Co., 2004 E.C.R.
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employed by IMS to report usage of pharmaceuticals to their
manufacturers. This structure divided Germany into discrete
geographical locations for the purpose of identifying sales vol-
umes (and thus usage) of different pharmaceuticals by location.
The European Commission took the view that IMS was required
to license its copyrighted structure to rival data collectors and
that its failure to do so constituted an abuse of dominant posi-
tion."' In its decision on appeal, the European Court of Justice
drew up guidelines for requiring compulsory licensing by hold-
ers of intellectual property rights.79 These guidelines appear to
give some comfort to IMS, although they are open to an expan-
sion (in subsequent caselaw) of the obligation of a rights holder
to license.
Translated into the terms of U.S. law, Magill and IMS
Health raise the question of whether a patent or copyright
might be construed as an "essential facility." Under U.S. law,
the courts have deemed the essential facility doctrine to require
the owner of a facility to make it available to rivals when certain
conditions are met: (1) one firm controls a facility; (2) competi-
tors cannot practically duplicate the facility; (3) the firm has de-
nied competitors use of the facility; and (4) it is feasible to pro-
vide the needed access and there is no business justification for
refusing to do so.8° By common consensus, the doctrine origi-
nated early in the twentieth century in the St. Louis Terminal
Railway case," where a consortium of railroads under the lead-
ership of Jay Gould obtained control over the two bridges and
ferry line that provided the only means for railway traffic to
cross the Mississippi River at St. Louis.82 In that case, the U.S.
Supreme Court effectively ruled that the facilities had to be
made available to all of the railroads that wished to use them. 3
The doctrine has been used throughout antitrust history but not
expansively. Indeed, it has come under increasing criticism in
recent decades. 4 Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court, in its re-
1-5039.
78. IMS Health Case C-418/01 52.
79. Id.
80. City of Anaheim v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1373, 1380 (9th Cir. 1992);
MCI Comm'ns Co. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1101, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983); see
Robert Pitofsky, Donna Patterson & Jonathan Hooks, The Essential Facilities Doc-
trine Under U.S. Antitrust Law, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 443 (2002).
81. United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
82. Id. at 397.
83. Id. at 411-13.
84. See, e.g., Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting
Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841 (1989).
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cent Trinko decision,85 referred to that doctrine as a creature of
the lower courts (rather than its own creation in Terminal
Railway) and even refused to say whether the doctrine has a
place in the antitrust laws.86 In light of Trinko, it appears
unlikely that U.S. courts would require access to patented or
copyrighted material under an essential facilities rationale.
Thus, the stage is set for this jurisdictional conflict over the
scope for the compulsory licensing of intellectual property to
generate trade tensions if and when the more stringent Euro-
pean law is applied to a non-European multinational business
firm. When this event occurs, the rhetoric employed will, as in
the other issues so far discussed, resemble ships passing in the
night. One side will speak in the language of competition law
while the other side will respond in the language of trade and
obligations under TRIPS.87
Although patents and copyrights might not be construed as
essential facilities, their presence may carry consequences in the
realm of tying and bundling. As observed above, the European
Commission has already faulted Microsoft for packaging its
Windows Media Player with its Windows operating system. Mi-
crosoft allegedly abused its dominant position in violation of Ar-
ticle 82. Because Microsoft produces an overwhelming share of
personal computer operating systems, it was apparent that Mi-
crosoft possessed a dominant position. Microsoft's integration of
Media Player into the operating system (in effect, a technologi-
cal tie) constituted the forbidden "abuse." As observed above,
the European treatment of this tie departs from the U.S. law be-
cause the U.S. law accords special treatment to the integration
of new functionalities into a software platform. A different but
related potential for conflict will now be examined.
The Magill line of cases appears to treat the possession of
intellectual property rights as potentially conferring a dominant
position upon their holders. This line of cases concerns itself
with whether an intellectual property rights holder must license
those rights to competitors. But there is potential for expansion.
If the possession of intellectual property rights is deemed to con-
85. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko L.L.P., 540 U.S.
398 (2004).
86. Id. at 410-11.
87. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1C, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPs].
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fer a dominant position, then perhaps under the approach ex-
emplified in Microsoft the European Commission will forbid any
intellectual property rights holder from packaging a second
product with the license. Should EU law develop in this way, it
would appear to be following a route different from the one that
U.S. law is presently taking.
U.S. law-in a manner not unlike EU law-treats tying ar-
rangements imposed by a firm possessing market power as per
se illegal.88 In the past, the antitrust case law has vacillated on
whether the existence of a patent-or even a copyright-
generates a presumption of market power sufficient to trigger
application of this per se rule.89 Congress, however, has indi-
cated that in the related patent law doctrine of misuse, actual
market power must be established before a commonplace tie
(i.e., the tie of a staple product) to a patent becomes unenforce-
able. 90 By contrast, in the antitrust context the issue of whether
a patent generates a presumption of market power-and
whether that presumption is rebuttable-has been a trouble-
some one for at least fifty years. In March 2006, however, the
Supreme Court revisited the issue of whether the mere exis-
tence of a patent raises a presumption of market power for anti-
trust purposes. In Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink,
Inc. , the Court ruled that it would not, thus clarifying an issue
that has unsettled antitrust law for half a century.
Under the Independent Ink ruling abolishing the presump-
tion of market power, U.S. antitrust law will conform more
closely to the current state of the patent misuse doctrine. A
plaintiff seeking to establish a tying violation will have to prove
market power; it will no longer be able to rely on a presumption
arising from the possession of a patent. But if the European au-
thorities infer a dominant position from the existence of a pat-
88. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15-16 (1984)
(holding tying arrangements as per se illegal when the firm employing them pos-
sesses power in the market for the tying product and the arrangement involves a
substantial amount of commerce in the market for the tied product).
89. See Daniel J. Gifford, The Antitrust/Intellectual Property Interface: An
Emerging Solution to an Intractable Problem, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 363, 369-70
(2002).
90. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2000).
91. 126 S.Ct. 1281 (2006). This ruling was not unexpected. See, e.g., Jonathan
H. Adler, Looking Ahead to the 2005-2006 Term, 2005 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 321, 345
("The American Bar Association, among others, filed briefs supporting Illinois Tool
Works' petition for certiorari so that Loew's could be overruled. A decision overturn-
ing Loew's seems likely. The question is whether the existence of a patent will be
entitled to any weight at all in a market power determination.").
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ent or a copyright and consider that tying constitutes an abuse
of that dominant position, then the European and U.S. laws will
conflict in yet another area. In such an event, the European
law-because it would contain the most extensive prohibition-
would act like a trade barrier, possibly prohibiting a wide range
of marketing activities. In some instances, such a prohibition
could bring to the fore as yet unresolved issues over the extent
and scope of international obligations to accord respect to intel-
lectual property rights.
V. STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY ISSUES
Although Ricardo's free trade analysis continues to generate
a powerful influence and nudge nations ever closer towards an
ultimate objective of global free trade, more recent scholarship
has identified circumstances in which one country may advance
its national interest by taking actions that promote its own trad-
ing interests at the expense of others. Developed largely in the
last quarter of the twentieth century, students of strategic trade
policy have noted that industries characterized by continuously
declining costs carry the potential for generating exports that
return supracompetitive profits to the exporting nation.92 By
nurturing such industries, therefore, a nation could generate fa-
vorable terms of trade, thereby augmenting its aggregate na-
tional wealth with the economic rents generated by those indus-
tries.93
Early in the twentieth century, economists developed the
theory of the optimal tariff.94 Under this theory, a large import-
ing nation that imposes a small tariff on imports may affect the
price of a good produced abroad for the export market.99 To the
extent that the domestic market of the importing nation is large
in relation to the supply available for export, a tariff can exert
downward pressure on the export price.9" For the importing na-
tion, the results of the tariff then are (1) the creation of a small
deadweight loss; (2) the imposition of higher prices on domestic
92. See, e.g., TYSON, supra note 49, at 3-4; Paul R. Krugman, Is Free Trade
Passo?, 1 ECON. PERSP. 131, 134-38 (1987).
93. See TYSON, supra note 49, at 3-4; Krugman, supra note 92 at 134-38.
94. See C. F. Bickerdike, The Theory of Incipient Taxes, 16 ECON. J. 529 (1906);
see also ELHANAN HELPMAN & PAUL R. KRUGMAN, TRADE POLICY AND MARKET
STRUCTURE 17-19 (MIT Press 1989).
95. HELPMAN & KRUGMAN, supra note 94, at 12-13.
96. Id. at 13.
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consumers; (3) a reduced foreign supply price; and (4) customs
revenues generated by the tariff.9' The latter are equal to the
amount of the tariff multiplied by the volume of imports. The
part of customs that reflects the reduced foreign supply price
will exceed the deadweight loss associated with the tariff so long
as the tariff is kept relatively small in amount. 98 This tariff,
therefore, increases aggregate national welfare.
In the late twentieth century, economists developed strate-
gic trade theory, a set of analytical approaches that identify
policies capable of enlarging national wealth by altering the
terms of trade. 9  Consider industries that experience continu-
ally falling unit costs. These falling costs may be due to scale
and/or scope economies or to learning-curve effects or both. In
those industries, a firm that is further along on its unit cost or
learning curve possesses an advantage over its rivals. As long
as it maintains its lead, it maintains a cost advantage. The in-
dustry characteristic of falling unit costs ensures that the indus-
try structure is not one of perfect competition and thus that su-
pracompetitive profits are available and cannot be competed
away. These profits will return to the exporting nation, advanc-
ing its aggregate welfare. In the early 1980s, economists used
game theory to show how a government might confer a trading
advantage on a domestic industry. Thus, as Barbara Spencer,
James Brander, and others have pointed out, the subsidization
of research and development can operate as a trade weapon.
Subsidization of a new Airbus model by European governments
might effectively preempt the field, making entry by Boeing (its
U.S. competitor) economically infeasible. °° Another such indus-
trial strategy involves the exercise of protectionism as a step in
generating economic rents from exports in imperfectly competi-
tive industries. Thus in the 1980s Japanese barriers to the im-
portation of semiconductor chips enabled its domestic producers
to proceed further on their learning curves than would have
been the case if its domestic market had been open. 10' Then,
having acquired this advantage from a protected domestic mar-
97. Id.
98. See id. This assumes that the tariff is set at an optimal amount and that
the import supply curve is rising.
99. Krugman, supra note 92.
100. See generally Barbara J. Spencer & James A. Brander, International R&D
Rivalry and Industrial Strategy, 50 REV. ECON. STUDIES 707 (1983); Avinash Dixit
& Albert S. Kyle, The Use of Protection and Subsidies to Entry Promotion and Deter-
rence, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 139 (1985).
101. TYSON, supra note 49, at 98.
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ket provided by their government, the Japanese semiconductor
firms entered the international marketplace at a higher level of
efficiency than they would otherwise have attained.102 Paul
Krugman, however, calculated that although the Japanese
strategy generated a domestic semiconductor industry that
would not have existed in a free trade context, the Japanese
strategy nonetheless appears to have reduced its own aggregate
welfare."°3
Strategic trade theory thus provides yet another basis for
the generation of tensions over trade. The Ricardian paradigm
rested upon the theory of comparative advantage. Strategic
trade theory now tells us how governments may artificially con-
struct comparative advantage. When nations exploit this possi-
bility, they are apt to generate tensions over trading issues. The
trade disputes generated by the Japanese government's foster-
ing of its domestic semiconductor industry and European gov-
ernments' support for a wide-body commercial aircraft industry
are the classic examples.
VI. THE INTERACTIONS AMONG INDUSTRIAL POLICY,
COMPETITION POLICY, AND TRADING POLICY
Although on the surface industrial policy, competition pol-
icy, and trade policy sometimes appear to be addressing differ-
ent concerns, these policies interact in a variety of ways. A gov-
ernment premises its support and encouragement for particular
industries (or even firms) that are the traditional core of indus-
trial policy upon insulating that industry (or those firms) from
intensive competition. Thus government administrators may
believe that a successful industrial policy entails an exemption
from competition policy. The Japanese Anti-Monopoly Law, for
example, contains explicit provisions designed to prevent the
competition policy embodied in that law from interfering with
that nation's industrial policies.' The European industrial pol-
icy aimed at the rehabilitation of the synthetic fiber industry
specifically authorized an industry cartel charged with oversee-
102. Id.
103. HELPMAN & KRUGMAN, supra note 94, at 174.
104. The Japanese Anti-Monopoly Law contains a range of exemptions in sec-
tions 21-24, including exemptions for depression cartels and rationalization cartels.
See MATSUSHITA, supra note 28, at 311-15.
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ing investment in new plant,105 a cartel that otherwise would
have been illegal under Article 81 of the Treaty."' Besides im-
pinging on competition policy, industrial policy can skew trade
policy. The Japanese Anti-Monopoly Law's exemption for indus-
trial policy will be unavailing unless the target industry is also
freed from foreign competition. Thus the successful implemen-
tation of industrial policy must contemplate the erection (or
maintenance) of the trade barriers necessary to provide this re-
lief. Similarly, the cartel authorized by the European Commis-
sion to oversee investment in the synthetic fiber industry would
be extremely handicapped in carrying out its task unless import
barriers protected the cartel members from foreign competition.
As discussed above, the rehabilitation of an industry
negatively impacted by a surge of imports can take place behind
the temporary import barriers authorized by the Agreement on
Safeguards." 8 In such cases, government oversight of the reha-
bilitation constitutes industrial policy and the rehabilitation
may require exemption of otherwise applicable competition
laws. In these instances, trading partners will understand from
the outset that although trade barriers have been erected, they
are both legitimate (as authorized by the Agreement on Safe-
guards) and temporary. Other interactions of industrial compe-
tition and trading policies are likely to generate trading ten-
sions.
In contrast with the above examples of rehabilitation stand
cases in which governments seek to foster a new industry. In
Japan, the government sought to foster a world-class semicon-
ductor chip industry in the 1980s, partially by protecting it from
foreign competition. 09 Elsewhere, European governments have
supported Airbus, inter alia, by providing it preferred financing
for some several decades."10 The aggregate policy mix in these
cases reflects the characteristics of the favored industry. Pro-
tection was the instrument of choice for the semiconductor chip
105. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
106. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, supra note 10,
art. 81.
107. See supra notes 18-40 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
109. See TYSON, supra note 49, at 95-96.
110. Daniel I. Fisher, "Super Jumbo" Problem: Boeing, Airbus, and the Battle for
the Geopolitical Future, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 865, 871 (2002); see also Jennifer
A. Manner, How to Avoid Airbus II: A Primer for Domestic Industry, 23 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 139, 142-44, 160-61 (1992). Cf. Ann McKinstry Denman, Airbus and Its
Ilk: Thumbing Their Noses at the GATT?, 29 HARv. INT'L L.J. 111, 118 (1988).
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industry. As discussed above, protection enabled the Japanese
domestic industry to advance on its learning curve. Preferred fi-
nancing has been the instrument of choice for the European
commercial aircraft industry where the key element is the
"launch" of a new model. Many U.S. observers see a violation of
the Agreement on Subsidies in the financing of Airbus, and
some see the skewing of competition policy as well."' As noted
above, some U.S. observers believe that the European Commis-
sion decision on the Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas merger was de-
signed to affect the relative competitiveness of the two rivals.
112
On the latter view, competition policy was skewed by industrial
policy.
VII. DISAGREEMENTS OVER THE ROLE OF ECONOMICS
As in many trading issues, broad agreement over funda-
mentals sometimes dissolves into disagreement at the concep-
tual margins. This phenomenon has arisen, inter alia, in con-
nection with so-called cultural issues and also with newly
developed methods of producing food products. The United
States and its trading partners have agreed that, in general,
they should open their markets to each other's exports. Yet a
number of these trading partners want to protect their motion
picture and audiovisual industries by reserving "screens" or
broadcasting time for the products of domestic producers. 113 The
rationale usually given for this protection is a desire to protect
national culture." In a similar situation, the EU has barred
imports of beef treated with hormones and much genetically-
altered food, import prohibitions that are matched by domestic
prohibitions on the production of similar products."5 The EU
justifies its import prohibitions on the basis of the precautionary
principle: Doubt on health issues should be resolved in favor of
safety." 6 Moreover, since the bar treats foreign and domestic
111. Fisher, supra note 110, at 874.
112. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
113. See discussion infra notes 120-31 and accompanying text.
114. Id.
115. See Werner P. Meng, The Hormone Conflict Between the EEC and the
United States Within the Context of GATT, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 819, 822 (1990) (de-
scribing the origin of the ban and its equal application to domestic and foreign
sources). The WTO recently ruled that the EU's restrictions on genetically modified
foods violate international trade law. See Andrew Pollack, World Trade Agency
Rules for U.S. in Biotech Dispute, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 8, 2006, at C6.
116. See Terrence P. Stewart & David S. Johanson, The WTO Beef Hormone
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producers alike, it is nondiscriminatory. By contrast, the U.S.
position on these issues is based solely on the economics of
trade. Markets should be open and consumers should decide for
themselves whether to purchase foreign cultural products or
whether to consume food products altered through hormone
technology or genetic manipulation." 7
A. CULTURAL ISSUES
A host of recent trade disputes have revealed that cultural
and attitudinal differences carry a potential for generating ten-
sions over trade. A number of jurisdictions, for example, have
adopted regulations that set minimum requirements for local
media content, such as television programming or motion pic-
ture exhibitions."' These regulations have the effect of blocking
foreign-produced television programming and motion pictures in
a manner analogous to a quota or quantitative restriction. They
are generally justified on a ground related to a need to preserve
local culture. France, Italy, the EU, Canada, and Australia are
among the jurisdictions that impose local-content regulations."9
Because the United States is a major exporter of motion pic-
tures and of television programming, it has generally taken a
critical view of local content requirements. Nonetheless, the
original GATT (1947) explicitly authorized the parties to impose
restrictions in favor of domestically-produced motion pictures.
Dispute: An Analysis of the Appellate Body Decision, 5 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y, 219, 229-30 (1999) (discussing the European Community's contentions based
on the precautionary principle and the rulings of the panel and Appellate Body on
those contentions).
117. See discussion infra notes 118-40 (describing the U.S. position on both is-
sues as favoring open markets and consumer choice).
118. See, e.g., Council Directive 89/552, 1989 O.J. (L 298) 23 ("Council Directive
of 3 October 1989 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regula-
tion or administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television
broadcasting activities"); Joseph Devlin, Note, Canada and International Trade in
Culture: Beyond National Interests, 14 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 177, 180 n.18 (2004);
John David Donaldson, "Television Without Frontiers": The Continuing Tension Be-
tween Liberal Free Trade and European Cultural Integrity, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
90 passim (1996).
119. Sandrine Cahn & Daniel Schimmel, The Cultural Exception: Does It Exist
In GATT and GATS Frameworks? How Does It Affect or Is It Affected by the Agree-
ment on TRIPS?, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 281, 282-83 (1997); Frederick Scott
Galt, Note, The Life, Death, and Rebirth of the "Cultural Exemption" in the Multilat-
eral Trading System: An Evolutionary Analysis of Cultural Protection and Interven-
tion in the Face of American Pop Culture's Hegemony, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L.
REV. 909, 924-28 (2004).
120. GATT, supra note 11, art. IV.
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Whether these provisions governed television and other audio-
visual matter, however, was a subject of a dispute which was
never successfully resolved prior to the Uruguay Round negotia-
tions. 2' In addition, both the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agree-
ment and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
exempt "cultural industries" from their provisions.12 ' The Uru-
guay Round negotiations over the General Agreement on Trade
in Services (GATS) culminated in an agreement that nominally
appears to include audiovisual services 123 but which allows na-
tions to exempt specified services from the most-favored nation
treatment that the Agreement generally mandates. 24 Although
the Annex provides that these exemptions should not exceed a
period of ten years, it also contemplates that they may be the
subject of future negotiations.' In the view of many commenta-
tors, the results of the GATS negotiations have left the long-
term legal status of cultural controls over audio-visual services
in a state of suspended ambiguity.
26
Critics of cultural exceptions have questioned their legiti-
macy on several grounds. Local content regulations are unnec-
essary if the mass of people want local content. Local content
regulations override consumer choice and to that extent are un-
democratic. Also, the bite of cultural exceptions occurs at the
level of popular culture, a realm that is generally unconcerned
with the history and tradition on which the higher culture (that
is often closely associated with national identity) is based. 27
Again, incidents in which local programming replaces foreign
programming with similar content raises the issue of whether
claims for cultural exceptions are-to some significant degree-
actually protectionist devices meant to provide economic bene-
121. See Robin L. Van Harpen, Note, Mammas, Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up
to be Cowboys: Reconciling Trade and Cultural Independence, 4 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE, 165, 169-70 (1995).
122. Can.-U.S. Free Trade Agreement arts. 2005, 2012, Jan. 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M.
281 (1988); North American Free Trade Agreement arts. 2106, 2107 & Annex 2106,
U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289.
123. General Agreement on Trade in Services, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183 (1995).
124. Id. art. XXIX.
125. Id. annex 11(5).
126. See, e.g., Galt, supra note 119, at 914-15; Beverly I. Moran, United States'
Trade Policy and the Exportation of United States' Culture, 7 VAND. J. ENT. L. &
PRAC. 41, 48-49 (2004).
127. See ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM 35-36, 117 (Cornell
Univ. Press 1983) (identifying high culture and nationalism); F.H. Buckley, Liberal
Nationalism, 48 UCLA L. REV. 221, 243 (2000) (discussing national identity and
high culture).
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fits to local business interests. The barring of a U.S. country
music channel on Canadian cable and its replacement by a Ca-
nadian country music channel gave such an appearance."'
Some commentators have suggested that European officials may
advance cultural arguments, at least in part, for economic
ends. 129 Finally, it is not always clear how domestic content
regulations actually protect local culture. France, for example,
requires that sixty percent of its television programming be pro-
duced within the EU and that French-language jurisdictions
produce forty percent. Yet it is not clear that a "European Un-
ion culture" (presumably composed of almost as many languages
and traditions as there are Member States in the EU) exists.3
Nor is it clear how U.S.-produced entertainment programming
differs from Canadian-produced English-language entertain-
ment programming.
B. HEALTH ISSUES AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
The United States and the EU have been at odds for more
than a decade over the issue of hormone-treated beef. The EU
has banned the importation of hormone-treated beef since
1989.132 In a WTO dispute settlement proceeding, the Appellate
Body affirmed a panel ruling in favor of Canada and the United
States, holding that the EU ban violated its obligations under
the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phyto-
sanitary Measures (SPS)133 because it was not supported by sci-
entific evidence.' The EU sought to justify its position on the
precautionary principle, but the Appellate Body ruled that the
precautionary principle does not justify actions that are other-
128. See Devlin, supra note 118, at 180.
129. Lisa L. Garrett, Comment, Commerce versus Culture: The Battle Between
the United States and the European Union Over Audiovisual Trade Policies, 19 N.C.
J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 553, 569 (1993).
130. Galt, supra note 119, at 927.
131. Donaldson, supra note 118, at 155 (quoting Ambassador Carla Hills raising
this issue).
132. See Kristin Mueller, Note, Hormonal Imbalance: An Analysis of the Hor-
mone Treated Beef Trade Dispute Between the United States and the European Un-
ion, 1 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 97, 99 (1996).
133. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
1867 U.N.T.S. 493 [hereinafter Agreement on Sanitary Measures].
134. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning
Meat and Meat Products, 1 124-25, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16,
1998) (adopted Feb. 13, 1998); see Stewart & Johanson, supra note 116, at 236-38.
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wise in violation of Article 5 of the SPS. 135 The EU has refused
to comply with the ruling and has since adopted a new directive
confirming its ban.36 The United States, in turn, has applied
sanctions on EU imports for its non-compliance. 37
An analogous issue involves genetically-modified food prod-
ucts (GMOs). Because of an apparently extremely slow-moving
approval process for GMOs, the United States, Canada, and Ar-
gentina instituted a WTO proceeding against the EU in 2003.138
In this dispute, like the dispute over beef hormones, the United
States is objecting to restrictions on the importation of food
products that are not justified by scientific evidence and the EU
is relying upon the precautionary principle. Although the ulti-
mate decision will involve an application of the SPS, and the
SPS requires that long-term restrictions justified on health
grounds must be based upon scientific evidence, the SPS-in
paragraph 7 of Article 5-does permit short-term restrictions on
imports based upon lesser evidence.'39 Some commentators be-
lieve that paragraph 7 provides a temporary safe harbor for EU
restrictions on the production and importation of GMO prod-
ucts. 140 A WTO Panel recently held that the EU's restrictions on
GMO products violate international trade law, but the EU is
appealing the issue."'
CONCLUSIONS
The concepts in which the world's trade agreements are cast
are often ambiguous or unclear at their margins. Although lack
of clarity at the margins is a general characteristic of language,
it lends itself to exploitation, creating tensions among nations
that are interested in how resolving that ambiguity will affect
the terms of trade. In the trade context, governments are sub-
135. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning
Meat and Meat Products, supra note 134, T 125.
136. See Raj Bhala & David A. Gantz, WTO Case Review 2004, 22 ARIZ. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 99, 114 (2005) (describing the history of the dispute over beef hormones
and the WTO litigation).
137. Id.
138. See David Winickoff et al., Adjudicating the GM Food Wars: Science, Risk,
and Democracy in World Trade Law, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 81, 82 (2005).
139. Agreement on Sanitary Measures, supra note 133, 1867 U.N.T.S. at 496.
140. Robert Howse & Petros C. Mavroidis, Europe's Evolving Regulatory Strat-
egy for GMOs-The Issue of Consistency with WTO Law: Of Kine and Brine, 24
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 317, 367-69 (2000); Winickoffet al., supra note 138, at 121.
141. See Pollack, supra note 115.
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ject to a variety of pressures, especially to those generated by in-
terests having a stake in trade. In nations with a large national
market like the United States, domestic producers for the inter-
nal market (and the unions representing their workers) are
prone to lobby for protectionist ends. In so doing, they exploit
the available trade rhetoric in their public relations campaigns,
attempting to generate political support for their goals. Other
nations are subject to analogous interest group pressures that
pursue increasingly sophisticated goals, such as those discussed
under the rubrics of industrial policy and strategic trade policy.
This essay has shown how the latter issues can sometimes blur
into protectionist constructions of competition laws. Indeed, in-
terpretations whose protectionist consequences are unknown to
the interpreting officials can generate protectionist results. Ac-
cordingly, there is a moral to be drawn from this discussion: ob-
servers of the world trading scene cannot be too sensitive to the
potential of language to be exploited for policy goals, including
policy goals that may even be at odds with the goals in the
minds of the original authors. Of course, international agree-
ments are often cast in intentionally ambiguous language in or-
der to defer the resolution of a troubling policy issue. That is
the negotiating game. The GATS handled the issue of the
audiovisual cultural exception in exactly this way, postponing
for another day the issues surrounding the absorption of audio-
visuals into the Agreement's framework. Yet while the special-
ists are fully aware of the way that they handle the nuances of
language, the broader public may miss these subtler issues.
Consequently, the resulting ambiguities lend themselves to ex-
ploitation. Indeed, even officials administering one set of poli-
cies may miss the impact of the rhetoric they employ on other
policies. Thus, officials too can prepare the ground for lobbying
and political manipulation.
The trade issues discussed in this essay are rooted, in sub-
stantial part, in the different ways that the language embodying
solid and broad agreement on core matters can be construed at
the margins. As these differences arise, they identify ambigui-
ties contained in the relevant treaty language, sometimes ambi-
guities that had gone previously unnoticed and sometimes am-
biguities that the parties had intentionally inserted. Tensions
are likely to increase in direct proportion to the trading impor-
tance of the ambiguities. Ultimately the ambiguity will likely
be resolved, either through WTO dispute resolution procedure,
or through further negotiation. That is the function of tension:
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to bring matters to a head for resolution. In some cases, how-
ever, tension continues indefinitely-the beef hormone dispute
is an example. Neither side will either concede or compromise.
Other examples include differences in competition law and some
aspects of the ways industrial policies affect the terms of trade.
These issues generate tensions, but the parties find it easier to
live with the tensions than to resolve the underlying disputes.
